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I consider the use of entanglement between two parties to
enable one to authenticate her identity to another over a quan-
tum communication channel. Exploiting the phenomenon of
entanglement-catalyzed transformations between pure states
gives a potentially reusable entangled identification token. In
analyzing this, I consider the independently interesting prob-
lem of the best possible approximation to a given pure entan-
gled state realizable using local actions and classical commu-
nication by parties sharing a different entangled state.
I. INTRODUCTION
The protocols to be presented in this paper give Al-
ice and Bob a way of identifying (“authenticating”) each
other, using quantum and classical channels. The pro-
tocols are such that if Alice and Bob can successfully
complete one, Alice is convinced that Bob (or someone
who has stolen his identification token) is on the other
end of the quantum communication channel. The clas-
sical analogue of this can be done by having Bob re-
veal, over a classical channel, a secret which Alice and
Bob had previously securely shared. The quantum pro-
tocols use shared entangled states as the counterpart of
shared secret key. The quantum version of the proto-
col differs from the classical protocol in potentially use-
ful ways. At the most elementary level, it authenti-
cates the presence of one quantum laboratory with cer-
tain causal relations to another on a network. (This is
accomplished using quantum information exchange; lest
it be thought impossible, we note that this might also be
accomplished via classical information exchange, using
quantum nonlocality.) There is protection, via the no-
cloning theorem, against copying of the authentication
token. Similar ideas may provide theft-detection capa-
bility, much as standard quantum cryptography provides
security against eavesdropping. Most interestingly, the
protocol based on using entangled “catalyst” states may
provide reusable authentication tokens, although the se-
curity properties when the tokens are reused will require
careful analysis.
II. THE TASK
The authentication task considered in this paper is
widely performed in practice, with computer login se-
quences and automatic teller PIN protocols among the
most common examples. It arises in settings where the
channel is considered sufficiently tamper-proof by the
users, but they wish to defend against a certain kind
of “terminal” insecurity: the possibility that the work-
station (or quantum lab) has been taken over by an im-
postor. For this to be relevant to the authenticity of a
session that follows authentication, there must be some
assumption that control of the terminal has a high de-
gree of intertemporal correlation. Perhaps there is some
probability per unit time that the control of the terminal
will be seized by an impostor. The probability of autho-
rized control of the terminal then decays exponentially
with time, but successful login-style authentication at a
later time resets the the probability to one, which could
provide (with a low enough decay rate) sufficiently in-
creased security for a session bounded in time and start-
ing with the authentication. Or, it may be assumed that
once Alice is logged in, transmission remains authentic
for the entire session; violations of terminal security are
assumed to require stealth on the part of the impostor,
and be infeasible (or low-probability) until Alice has left
the terminal.
Such protocols are sometimes used as a prelude to fur-
ther communication, for example in a login sequence for
remote use of a computer. Without assumptions such
as those of the previous paragraph, these protocols do
not provide a solid guarantee of authenticity for the rest
of the session. Someone could allow you to log in, then
block your access and tap the line for their own purposes.
Demonstrating authenticity for the entire session in the
presence of such a threat requires methods such as the
protocol based on universal hash functions [1,2]. (Such
protocols are used, for example, to authenticate the clas-
sical communication involved in quantum key distribu-
tion protocols.) In these protocols the degree of security
associated with shared secret key bits may be transferred
to the authenticity of the message, by hashing the mes-
sage and the secret key using a certain type of universal
hash function, and sending the hash along with the (un-
encrypted) message over the public channel. The receiver
then hashes the message with his copy of the secret key,
and compares to the sent hash; tampering (with either
message or hash or both) by someone without knowledge
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of the key is overwhelmingly likely to yield a tampered-
with hash which is not the valid hash of the authentic
message.
Whether the authenticity of the quantum authentica-
tion tokens discussed in this paper, which are a coun-
terpart of the classical notion of shared secret key, can
be transferred to an entire communication session in
the manner of the universal hashing protocol described
above, is an extremely interesting question. A simple
adaptation of the classical protocol would seem difficult
in the case in which the user who logs in may wish to act
as a conduit for quantum states unknown to her, since
the hashing protocol requires two copies of the message,
one to be hashed and sent and the other to be sent unal-
tered. The preparation-visible case seems more promis-
ing, although this is a severe restriction.
III. QUANTUM AUTHENTICATION USING
ENTANGLEMENT
Rather than using a shared classical secret, Alice and
Bob authenticate via a shared entangled quantum state.
Unlike the key in a classical scheme, this quantum key
need not be secret, although keeping it secret might make
it harder to steal (particularly if it is not maximally en-
tangled), and might have other advantages in a many-
user setup. Perhaps the simplest scheme is for Alice and
Bob to share some maximally entangled states; Alice, at
least, knows which states. To authenticate, Bob sends
Alice his half of some of the states; Alice then performs
tests on them to assure herself they are indeed the speci-
fied Bell states. Say they are all the same Bell state; Bob
sends N of them, and Alice measures them in the Bell
basis; by increasing N , she can distinguish these states
more and more reliably (at a rate which depends on the
noise in the overall process) from any states that could
come from an impostor which are actually not entangled
with her states. In fact, in a d-dimensional Hilbert space
the maximum matrix element 〈ψ|ρ|ψ〉 for a separable ρ
to pass a test for being a maximally entangled |ψ〉 is 1/d
(this occurs where ρ is pure, and is any one of the prod-
uct states occuring in the Schmidt decomposition). Thus
security increases exponentially in the number of qubits
(log2 d) used.
The quantum scheme differs from its classical counter-
part in several potentially useful respects. With a clas-
sical secret, an impostor would have to break into Bob’s
classical storage area and copy his secret key; it is phys-
ically possible to do so without evidence of the break-in.
The impostor and Bob could both communicate with Al-
ice, who might not realize anything was wrong for quite
a while. Both would be able to authenticate. By con-
trast, an impostor who stole Bob’s half of a quantum au-
thentication key would have to be able to always divert
the authentication portion of a communication session to
himself, should he wish to allow Alice and Bob to commu-
nicate unaware of the loss of their authentication token.
The quantum scheme is also more directed: steal Alice’s
classical (symmetric-crypto) key and you have what Al-
ice and Bob share; steal Alice’s half of an entangled state
and you still can’t pretend to Alice that you’re Bob. The
no-cloning theorem not only makes undetected theft of
key more difficult, but also protects a stolen key from
dissemination to wide sectors of the underworld. Steal
Alice’s classical key, and you can distribute it to your
henchmen all over, who can pretend to be Alice when
and where they want. Steal her half of an entangled
state, and there’s no way of distributing it among your
henchpeople (or henchthings, for that matter).
Either the maximally-entangled-state quantum au-
thentication protocol or the classical shared-secret pro-
tocol uses up some of the shared key each time authen-
tication takes place. By contrast, a catalysis protocol
does not. The fact that the shared key is (or can be)
used up each time authentication takes place renders the
EPR protocol better for certain purposes: for example,
for banknotes it could be good that the state is returned
to the bank and destroyed in the authentication process.
Such entangled “money” would have the desirable prop-
erties of transferability and uncopyability, but not the
properties of untraceability or anonymity, nor does the
present discussion provide a protocol for verification of its
value, let alone nondestructive verification of its value, by
third parties; it is far from constituting proper quantum
cash. Schemes more suitable for quantum cash were pro-
posed by Wiesner [3] and Bennett, Brassard, Breidbart
and Wiesner [4]; they involve nonorthogonality rather
than entanglement. For other purposes, however, it may
be good to have a reusable i.d. token. The catalysis
protocol presented in Section V may provide such a to-
ken. The next section provides background for the un-
derstanding of catalysis.
IV. LOCC-CONVERTIBILITY AND CATALYSIS
Nielsen [5] showed that a pure state |ψ〉 in a Hilbert
space A ⊗ B is convertible to another, |χ〉, by local ac-
tions and classical communication (LOCC), if and only
if the nonincreasingly-ordered eigenvalues of the reduced
density matrix of |χ〉 majorize those of |ψ〉. (These
are sometimes called the OSC’s, ordered Schmidt co-
efficients, of the pure states. I will use the notation
λi(|η〉〈η|) for the ordered eigenvalues of the reduced den-
sity matrix of |η〉〈η|, rather than for those of the den-
sity matrix of |η〉〈η| itself as in more standard notation.)
That is, the target state’s reduced density matrix is “less
mixed”; it is natural to suppose this means it is less en-
tangled, and the theorem confirms this intuition. I will
write this relation (which is a partial ordering on the
pure states) |χ〉  |ψ〉, and write |ψ〉 ⊲⊳ |χ〉 when nei-
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ther |ψ〉  |χ〉 nor |χ〉  |ψ〉. (The relation “” may
thus be read “is less entangled than.”) I will also use
the obvious ordering this induces on one-dimensional pro-
jectors on these states, and extend it to density matri-
ces in the manner of Vidal [6]. He defined d − 1 en-
tanglement measures Ek, which are sums of the k low-
est Schmidt eigenvalues, and are nonincreasing under
LOCC. Define Sk(|η〉〈η|) :=
∑k
i=1 λi(|η〉〈η|) . Also define
Ek−d+1(|η〉〈η|) := 1 − Sk(|η〉〈η|) ≡
∑d
k−d+1 λi(|η〉〈η|) .
Extend this to mixed states via:
Sk(ρ) := max
{tj ,|ηj〉|
∑
j
tj |ηj〉〈ηj |=ρ}
∑
j
tjSk(|ηj〉〈ηj |) . (1)
Equivalently, one could define
Ek(ρ) := min
{tj ,|ηj〉|
∑
j
tj |ηj〉〈ηj |=ρ}
∑
j
tjEk(|ηj〉〈ηj |) . (2)
Define
ρ1  ρ2 := ∀k,Ek(ρ1) ≥ Ek(ρ2) . (3)
This is the extension of the majorization-based “more en-
tangled than” relation to mixed states. Vidal [6] showed
that the Ek−d+1 := 1 − Sk are entanglement montones,
hence cannot be increased by LOCC. Jonathan and Ple-
nio [7] state (indeed, they make a somewhat more gen-
eral statement; cf. also [8]) that the partial ordering (3)
in fact coincides with LOCC-convertability. This is, of
course, a generalization of Nielsen’s theorem to mixed
states. Jonathan and Plenio [9] have used Nielsen’s The-
orem to show the existence of pairs of states |ψ〉 ⊲⊳ |χ〉,
such that if Alice and Bob share a particular entangled
state |φ〉, they may nonetheless convert |ψ〉 into |χ〉 by
LOCC, while retaining |φ〉 unchanged at the end of the
process. In this paper, this phenomenon is exploited to
give a potentially reusable quantum identification token.
V. THE CATALYSIS PROTOCOL
Here, Alice and Bob share a catalyst state |φ〉. There
are incommensurate states |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 such that in the
presence of the catalyst, |φ1〉 can be converted to |φ2〉,
while retaining |φ〉. For Bob to authenticate himself to
Alice, Alice makes |φ1〉 in her laboratory, and sends half
of it to Bob. They then go through the steps, involving
local measurements, one-way communication of measure-
ment results, and local operations conditional on those
measurement results, which convert |φ1〉 to |φ2〉. If Al-
ice’s quantum channel leads to a cheating Derek, who
does not possess any subsystem involved in the catalyst
state, by Nielsen’s result this conversion cannot succeed.
So the protocol continues by having Bob return to Al-
ice the B half of the system which they were to convert
into |φ2〉. She then measures the projector onto |φ2〉. If
(with the idealization of perfect operations and measure-
ments) she ever gets the result “0”, she knows that Bob
was not involved in the protocol (assuming Bob would al-
ways implement the protocol correctly were he involved).
Usually, even if an impostor is involved, the measurement
result will be “1”. But the small probability of “0” in that
case can be amplified by repeating the protocol. This has
no cost in the stored catalyst state, though it has a cost
(polynomial in the desired accuracy) in quantum com-
munication.
A weak upper bound on the one-shot probability of
error (of getting “1” from an impostor) can be gotten
by considering the (convex) set of less entangled states
(those whose OSC’s majorize |φ1〉’s). Let ρ∗ be the clos-
est of these states (in the L1 norm distance which corre-
sponds to error probability) to |φ2〉; then pe = 〈φ2|ρ∗|φ2〉.
This can be used to obtain, for a specified ǫ, an expres-
sion, polynomial in 1/ǫ, for a number of repetitions guar-
anteed to give error probability below ǫ. It is a bound
because only the less entangled states are accessible via
a protocol between Alice and an impostor Derek unen-
tangled with those of Alice’s systems involved in the pro-
tocol. It is a weak bound because choosing the nearest
of those states means considering Alice as conniving with
Derek to fool herself. In the actual situation, Alice will
not perform her part of a protocol for converting |φ1〉 to
|φ∗〉, but rather will still perform her part of the protocol
for converting |φ1〉 to |φ2〉. As Chris Fuchs pointed out to
me, when Alice does the correct protocol in the presence
of the impostor, she will of course wind up with the same
reduced density matrix she would have if there had been
no impostor; i.e., the reduced density matrix of |φ2〉. So,
we may now look at the closest state, not merely among
the less entangled states, but in the (still convex) set of
less entangled states having the same density matrix for
Alice as |φ2〉. Since |φ2〉 and local unitary transforma-
tions of it are not in the majorized set, the closest such
state will be mixed.
Our weak bound on the error probability is given by
max
ρ|φ1〉〈φ1|
〈φ2|ρ|φ2〉 . (4)
This problem would be very much simplified if we could
assume the optimal state ρ∗ were pure, but it is not ob-
vious this should be so. It is clear that the majoriza-
tion constraint on ρ prevents us from attaining 1 in this
maximization, but in order to use the protocol in a par-
ticular instance, we need an upper bound below 1. One
more tractable upper bound comes from considering the
d−1 maximization problems in which only one of the ma-
jorization constraints is imposed, and taking the lowest
of these maxima.
min
k=1,...,d−1
max f(ρ) := 〈φ2|ρ|φ2〉
subject to
Ek(ρ) ≤ ζk . (5)
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Here ζk := Ek(|φ1〉〈φ1|). Because of the definition of Ek
as a minimum over ensembles, we can recast the inner
maximization as a maximization of f over all ensembles
of pure states:
max f(s1, ..., sn, |η1〉, ..., |ηn〉) :=
∑
j
sj|〈φ2|ηj〉|2
subject to∑
j
sjEk(|ηj〉〈ηj |) ≤ ζk . (6)
Here sj are probabilities, and |ηj〉 pure states. n may
vary, but there will be a bound from a Davies-type argu-
ment. Moreover, there will be a maximum for which all
the states |ηj〉 are Schmidt-codiagonal with |φ2〉. This
follows from two observations. First, Lemma 1 below,
which implies that each term in the objective function is
maximized (for fixed qj), by an |ηj〉 Schmidt-codiagonal
with |φ2〉. Second, the fact that the local unitary trans-
formation required to get an arbitrary |ηj〉 into that form
has no effect on the value of the constraint function, since
Ek is invariant under local unitaries.
Lemma 1:
For fixed Schmidt coefficients, the pure state |χ〉 which
maximizes |〈φ|χ〉|2 has the same Schmidt basis as |φ〉.
Proof:
We show this by mapping the pure states of the
d2-dimensional system AB onto operators on a d-
dimensional Hilbert space, in such a way that the inner
product in the tensor product vector space becomes the
Hilbert-Schmidt inner product of the operators. Denote
such a map by σ, and use the notation
σ(|χ〉) := Gχ. (7)
Then
〈φ|χ〉 ≡ tr G†φGχ . (8)
We may change to an arbitrary Schmidt basis by local
unitaries. In this formalism, and writing the reduced
density matrices as φ1 and χ respectively, unitaries cor-
responding to changing |χ〉’s Schmidt bases in the A and
B system are mapped, one-to-one, onto unitaries U and
W such that Gχ = Uχ
1/2W . Let χ and φ1 be diagonal in
the same basis, for simplicity; by varying over U and W
we vary over G operators corresponding to all Schmidt
bases, for given eigenvalues. Thus
maxunitaryU,W |trφ1/21 Uχ1/2W |
= maxunitaryV,Y |〈φ1|V ⊗ Y |χ〉| . (9)
A result of Von Neumann [10,11] states that this max-
imum occurs where φ
1/2
1 and χ
1/2 are codiagonal, and
their eigenvalues are matched in order of size. This proves
Lemma 1.
Now we show that there is an ensemble solving (6)
which contains just one pure state. As just argued, we
may confine our attention to ensembles of states Schmidt-
codiagonal with |φ2〉. Thus, the squared inner products
whose average is the objective function in (6) are just
squared Bhattacharyya overlaps
B2(p,q) := (
∑
i
√
piqi)
2 (10)
between the Schmidt eigenvalues pi of |φ2〉 and those (qi)
of the states |ηj〉; since B2 is concave in one argument
[12], replacing the sj-ensemble by the vector with the
sj-averaged Schmidt coefficients will increase the objec-
tive function. Moreover, this will keep the value of the
constraint function unchanged. To be explicit, define
|η〉 :=
∑
i
√∑
j
sjqij |i〉|i〉 (11)
where qij are the ordered Schmidt coefficients of |ηj〉.
Then
|〈φ2|η〉|2 = (
∑
i
√
pi
∑
j
sjqij)
2 ≥
∑
j
sj(
∑
i
√
piqij)
2
≡
∑
j
sj|〈φ2|ηj〉|2 . (12)
while (for any k)
Sk(|η〉〈η|) =
k∑
i=1
(
∑
j
sjqij) =
∑
j
sj(
k∑
i=1
qij)
=
∑
k
sjSk(|ηj〉〈ηj |) . (13)
This argument doesn’t immediately extend to the
multi-constraint problem. Each Ek is defined by an inde-
pendent minimization over ensembles; therefore one can’t
recast the multiconstraint problem as an single maxi-
mization over ensembles.
If we nevertheless assume the solution is pure in the
original multi-constraint problem, it reduces to:
max
q1,...,qd
∑
i
√
piqi
subject to :
ζk −
k∑
i=1
qi ≤ 0 (k = 1, ..., d),
−qi ≤ 0 ,∑
i
qi − 1 ≤ 0 , (14)
where pi, qi, ri are the reduced density matrix eigenval-
ues of |φ2〉, |χ〉, and |φ1〉 respectively, and ζk :=
∑k
i=1 rk.
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Since the objective function is concave in q and the feasi-
ble set (since it is given by a conjunction of linear inequal-
ities gi(q) ≤ 0)) is convex, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
are necessary and sufficient for a maximum [13] as long
as constraint qualification holds. These are:
∂f(q)
∂qi
=
∑
i
λi
∂gi(q
∗)
∂qj
. (15)
Here λi ≥ 0, with λi = 0 for slack constraints.
In our problem the objective function f(q) :=∑
i
√
piqi has derivatives
∂f/∂qi = (1/2)
√
pi/qi . (16)
The positivity constraints on the qi will be slack because
the partial derivatives go to +∞ at qi = 0.
Here is an example of the weak bound, using states
from [9]. These are:
|φ1〉 =
√
0.4|00〉+
√
0.4|11〉+
√
0.1|22〉+
√
0.1|33〉
|φ2〉 =
√
0.5|00〉+
√
0.25|11〉+
√
0.25|22〉 . (17)
We will make the assumption that the optimal state is
pure, which will turn out to be correct in this particular
case. If we start with |φ1〉 and reallocate Schmidt co-
efficients from lower-weight to higher-weight basis states
(so that the resulting state “majorizes” |φ1〉, it is clear
we should take all of the weight from |33〉 and move it
to a higher-probability state, say |22〉 to get its proba-
bility closer to p2’s. I chose to allocate it to q2 because
the derivative of the objective function was largest with
respect to q2, even after the reallocation of all of q3 to
it. No further increase in q2 is possible, since the weight
would have to come from q0 or q1, and that would vi-
olate the majorization constraint q0 + q1 = 0.8. Real-
locating that 0.8 optimally between the q0 and q1 (by
equating derivatives of the objective function with re-
spect to them) yields q0 =
√
8/15, q1 =
√
4/15. There is
(of course) still no advantage to reallocating q2 to either
of the larger probabilities, since ∂f/∂q2 is still the largest
derivative. Thus
|χ∗〉 =
√
8/15|00〉+
√
4/15|11〉+
√
0.2|22〉 . (18)
Hence pe = |〈χ|φ2〉|2 = .9964102.... Moreover, here the
only binding majorization constraint is q0 + q1 ≥ 0.8.
Therefore, this also solves the problem with that con-
straint alone, and so provides a genuine upper bound
on the protocol’s error probability. This is, of course,
quite high, but since the error is one-sided it can be ex-
ponentially suppressed by repetition. For example, after
two thousand repetitions we get pe = .0007522.... Still,
computation of the stronger bound obtained from con-
sideration of Alice performing the actual protocol is ob-
viously desirable. For practical purposes, it might be
very useful to find examples of catalyzable transforma-
tions |φ1〉 → |φ2〉 for which the error probability of any
local approximation of the transformation is bounded
much further below 1. It is natural to look in higher-
dimensional systems for such examples. Such pairs of
states must be incommensurable, and Nielsen has conjec-
tured that incommensurability approaches being generic
in high-dimensional systems. Whether catalyzability is
equally common (or whether it is measure-zero even for
finite-dimensional systems) is an interesting question.
The distinguishability of a maximally entangled state
from the separable states increases with dimensionality,
with error-probability approaching zero. It is natural to
ask whether the error probability for distinguishing states
locally produced from a given state from some state lo-
cally producible only with the aid of a catalyst may be
made to approach zero in some sequence of examples of
increasing dimension.
Whatever the ultimate judgement on the catalyzed
protocol from the cryptographic standpoint, the opti-
mization problem discussed in this section, of finding the
closest approximation to |φ2〉 obtainable by local quan-
tum operations and quantum communication, given the
state |φ1〉, is of independent interest.
VI. SECURITY
How secure is this protocol? The error probability
above gives a measure. Since Alice may destroy her
test states (the ones to be turned from |φ1〉 into |φ2〉)
after each use, coherent eavesdropping involving these
states may seem unlikely to be of any use in corrupting
later uses of the protocol. However, one must investigate
whether a Derek able to divert some of the quantum com-
munications, and possibly also impersonate Alice or Bob
during the classical discussion1, could redirect the cata-
lyst state to himself and use it in later rounds. If Derek
is a true man-in-the-middle, he could receive Alice’s test
state, keep it, and send whatever he wanted to Bob. (He
could even send half of a |φ1〉 state.) If he could also
impersonate Alice and Bob on the classical channel, then
he could in fact do the protocol with Bob (who would
be using half of a Derek-supplied |φ1〉 state). He could
then send the resulting |φ2〉 state on to Alice. But that’s
not “really” a problem with the protocol: Alice is indeed
identifying herself. (Of course, Derek can jam her ability
to i.d. herself, if he has this setup, but men-in-the-middle
can always do that.) But can Derek steal the catalyst?
1Classical hashing techniques could be used to prevent this,
but this would require using up classical secret key, and, if
crucial to security, might obviate some advantages conferred
by the quantumness of the remainder of the protocol.
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It’s somewhat plausible that he could. For, he can send
whatever state he wants to Bob (even one entangled with
a system Derek keeps), while keeping the state Alice sent
him. Bob will measure this other state jointly with his
end of the catalyst, and broadcast the result. Bob will
even send the noncatalyst part of the measured system
back to Derek. The basic elements present (entanglement
between Derek and Bob, joint measurement by Bob of
the system entangled with Derek and Bob’s part of the
catalyst, and broadcast by Bob of the measurement re-
sult) are also present in a protocol for teleporting Bob’s
part of the catalyst state to Derek. There is of course no
guarantee (and probably no particular reason to think)
that this is such a teleportation protocol. Quite possibly,
anything Derek does to steal the catalyst will be likely to
make the conversion procedure fail (after all, the simplest
procedure for ensuring its success, which is for Derek to
just act as a conduit for |φ1〉, cannot steal the catalyst).
But a full analysis is required before claiming that the
catalysis protocol is secure when reused (and reuse is
necessary just to get the error probability acceptably low,
in the example given above). It seems almost too good
to be true that a phenomenon such as catalysis, closely
linked to properties (e.g. incommensurability, in the op-
erational sense of non-interconvertibility via LOCC) of
finite-dimensional quantum states that disappear when
the tasks defining them are defined asymptotically on
large numbers of copies, should nevertheless be usable
by repetition to achieve asymptotically useful results in
a cryptographic task. But quantum information has sur-
prised us before. And even if repeated authentication via
catalysis turns out not to be secure, knowing this (and
knowing why) will shed light on the phenonomenon of
catalysis and related information-theoretic concepts and
tasks.
The teleportation attack scenario is not so worrisome
in the case in which only “terminal security” is at is-
sue, which is the one in which using the login protocol
as a prelude to further communication makes the most
sense. Nevertheless, it is worth investigating, if any level
of channel insecurity exists: it would enable channel inse-
curity to become terminal insecurity over time. Also, in a
model with no channel insecurity, it is questionable why
one would want to use the catalysis protocol instead of
the maximally-entangled protocol. For then the problem
of using up the supply of entangled key may be solved
by sharing more entangled states over the (supposedly se-
cure) quantum channel during the period of high terminal
security initiated by authentication. With any terminal
insecurity, the security of the currently-used entangled
states will decay with repeated sessions (some of the new
entangled states may occasionally be transmitted to an
impostor). Possibly this is not so for the catalyst states
even with some terminal insecurity during a communi-
cation session, since once shared the catalyst states are
never retransmitted; here, again, teleporting attacks are
the issue.
VII. CONCLUSION
I have given some protocols with which two parties may
share an entangled quantum state, and use it as a secure
identification token. The simplest protocols just involve
sharing a maximally entangled state of high-dimensional
quantum systems; authentication is accomplished by one
party’s sending the other her half of the state, which can
then be distinguished by measurement from anything a
disentangled impostor could present. Advantages over
classical shared secrets might include theft detectability,
uncopiability, and of course the ability to authenticate a
quantum laboratory’s presence on a quantum network.
The possibility of a protocol based on the ability of some
shared entangled states to catalyze certain transforma-
tions between other shared entangled states (which would
otherwise be impossible by local actions and classical
communication) was also introduced. This occasioned
some analysis of the problem, interesting in itself, of the
best LOCC approximation to such a transformation. An
interesting potential advantage of the catalysis protocol
is repeatability without using up the identification to-
ken. Showing the security, or lack of it, of repeated use
of this protocol could illuminate several interesting areas
of the theory of quantum information and entanglement,
in addition to shedding light on nature of the curious
phenomenon of catalysis.
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